Aviation continues to move in a direction of improved safety, but accidents happen which set the aviation community back with a question of how we can improve. Looking at the statistics, aviation has become safer than it has ever been, but it is an industry that can always improve safety practices. The following is an analysis of what is known so far about a midair collision earlier this month at North Las Vegas Airport (VGT) between a Cessna 172N Skyhawk and a Piper PA-46 Malibu Mirage that killed all four people on board the two planes.
North Las Vegas Airport (KVGT)
North Las Vegas Airport lies 8 nautical miles north/northwest of Harry Reid International Airport (KLAS). North Las Vegas Airport offers 3 different runways for pilots to utilize. Airmen can choose from runway 07-25, 12R-30L, or 12L-30R. The aircraft involved in the collision were landing on parallel runways 30L and 30R. The field is also controlled by an air traffic control tower, which assists pilots from ground operations such as taxiing to the active runway, taking off, or landing.
Weather at KVGT at the time of the crash
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed during the time of the accident. Temperatures were in the triple digits, density altitude was high, and winds were light and out of the northwest (as this is normal during summertime in Las Vegas) but neither the temperature, density altitude, nor winds contributed to the accident. Visibility was also greater than 10 statute miles, with the sun high on the horizon during the accident. So, it is believed that the weather was not the cause of this accident.
North Las Vegas Airport collision narrative
On July 17, around noon, two planes collided during landing at North Las Vegas Airport. The two airplanes involved were a Piper Malibu (N97CX) & a Cessna 172 (N160RA). Both aircraft had two occupants on board at the time of the midair collision. The Malibu was inbound from Coeur D’Alene, Idaho (KCOE) for a full-stop landing. Radio transmissions revealed when the pilot of the Malibu switched over to tower frequency for the initial call, a fellow pilot on the same frequency recognized the pilot and even said “hello” followed by the pilot’s name. The tower issued the Malibu a clearance to cross over midfield to join the left downwind and to land on runway 30L. It is apparent that at least one of the pilots in the Malibu was familiar with operations in and out of North Las Vegas Airport by the radio transmissions.
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Also in the pattern was a Cessna 172 Skyhawk, tail number N160RA, a local aircraft practicing touch-and-goes on 30R. It appears that that 172 was on its seventh lap around the pattern and was flying a right-hand traffic pattern. Although acknowledging multiple times cleared to land on 30L, the Malibu crossed over midfield and started a descending left turn to join the final approach for 30L, during this time the aircraft instead of lining up for 30L, descended and lined up for 30R, the runway for which the Skyhawk was lined up. At this time, the Malibu descended into the final approach course (extended runway centerline) for 30R and collided with the Cessna 172.
General Aviation Aircraft Blind Spots
Within general aviation, one will find a variety of aircraft to choose from in two categories, high wing or low wing. With this, high or low wings have their pros and cons. One of the biggest is their blind spots. In a high wing, the wings are above the fuselage of the aircraft so everything beneath the aircraft is visible to the pilot, but anything above the aircraft is blocked by the wings, making anything above the aircraft not visible to the pilot.
The opposite is true for low-wing aircraft. Everything above the aircraft is visible to the pilot, but anything directly underneath is blocked by the wings of the aircraft.
The accident occurring at North Las Vegas Airport is a prime example of a low-wing aircraft descending into a high-wing aircraft. During the descent, both aircraft were affected by one another’s blind spots. Since the low wing was descending, anything directly below was not in the pilots’ view, and anything directly above the Cessna was blocked by the wings.
Air Traffic Control Responsibilities
Numerous people may question and point fingers that the air traffic controller during the time of the collision, but the fault appears to lie upon the pilots. The reason being is that when the weather is what pilots call “severe clear” or when VFR conditions prevail, it is ultimately the pilot, not the air traffic controller’s responsibility to see-and-avoid traffic. It is too early to know if the pilot operating the Malibu was made aware that another aircraft was in the pattern, but 99% of the time air traffic control will point out any traffic near your aircraft. Especially if the aircraft is flying in the pattern on a parallel runway to your intended runway of use.
Another aspect of the accident is that the pilot of the Malibu was given a clearance, acknowledged, and read back that they were cleared to land on 30L several different times. The responsibility of air traffic control is to provide separation of aircraft, and the controller cleared the aircraft to fly to the opposite end of the airport and to land on a runway that would not cause two aircraft to collide in midair. The air traffic controller cannot take the blame for the error made by the pilot in the Malibu disregarding the clearance and lining up on the incorrect runway, ultimately causing a midair collision.
Human Error
Humans are prone to error, but there are practices pilots can use to minimize these errors. First, one of the largest human errors is by the name of expectation bias for which pilots should be constantly on alert. An example of such bias is listening for what you want, or what you expect to hear, rather than what you are told. For example, after receiving the same clearance for the past 10 flights into an airport, the clearance will change, and as humans, we will listen to what we want and what we have always used. Ultimately, we might disregard what we are told, and go with what we have heard for an extended period of time.
Secondly, belly checks. Pilots should be aware of the blind spots on their aircraft whether this is a high wing with the blind spot being above the aircraft, or a low wing where the blind spot is beneath the aircraft, and practice ways to avoid this. One way we can avoid this is by performing a belly check. In the scenario of the Malibu making a left turn to join final approach before the pilot makes the left turn to join the final, a right turn can be made to clear below the left wing, which is soon to be below the pilot, and blocking the view for any traffic on final.
It is unknown why the pilot operating the Malibu disregarded the clearance to land on 30L. Potentially due to expectation bias and the pilot wanting to or expecting to land on 30R because it is the longer runway of the two, or because of the displaced parallel runways, but at least one of the pilots was familiar with flying in or out of North Las Vegas and was familiar with the runways.
The combination of performing belly checks, being aware of expectation bias, and double, if not triple checking one is landing on the correct runway can be an essential step to avoid devastating midair collisions.
Editor’s note: This article is the analysis of the known facts involved in this collision at the time of publication and represents the conclusion of one pilot. The federal investigation of the collision is being handled by the NTSB, which has said could take months or more to reach a final conclusion.
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